05/09/88 - LAWSUIT, BALLEW'S V. AHC & AVCO
- - - BALLEW'S DISCLOSURE - EXCESS OPERATING TEMPERATURE AND RELATED FAILURES
- - - BALLEW'S DISCLOSURE - OVERCHARGES AND UNAPPROVED CHANGES INCLUDING GP MODULE
- - - BALLEW'S DISCLOSURE - MANUFACTURER'S SECRET REPORT - TOP 50 PRODUCTION FAILURES
12/00/89 - USCG & DOT CONFIRM BALLEW'S FRAUD ITEMS.
08/30/99 - LAWSUIT, BALLEW V. DOJ - FOR DOJ FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT & CONVERSION, ETC.

A FOIA request obtained a DOT internal Report that proves that the USCG’s Product Improvement Program’s problem targets are the same exact defects that Ballew identified and disclosed to FBI, Main Justice, and the USCG. These government agencies intentionally and fraudulently misrepresented these "FCA fraud identified proceeds" as "contract fraud claim proceeds" so that the agency could keep the value instead of returning the value to the U.S. Treasury as the FCA laws require. The Treasury Department has yet to do its job to recover this value and money for the Treasury.

Unfettered Budget Control. The defrauded agencies fought unfairly to prevent the (1) cash "fraud recovery proceeds" delivery to or restoration to Treasury and (2) their loss of their allocated budget funds for neither preventing, identifying, stopping, investigating nor litigating the fraud against their agency. The DOJ or Justice Department is the defrauded agencies' attorneys of record, the FBI is the DOJ's investigators and they all face the same Congressional oversite reviews, questions and possible sanctions or criticism.

CURRENT ENGINE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE The USCG's LTS 101 engine reliability and maintainability problems have had significant adverse impacts on both costs and aircraft availability. There also are certain operational issues related to the current engine. Some key indicators are listed below.



• The USCG has not been able to meet its aircraft availability goal of 71%, due primarily to premature failure of critical engine parts and to problems with spare parts supply. During the past two year, availability has ranged between about 53% and 62%. (Page xiii)

• The USCG has had to take engines out of service for maintenance far more frequently than was expected. The expected cycle for depot overhaul was 2400 engine-hours. Actual engine mean time to depot was 255 engine-hours between July 1988 and February 1989, improving to about 400 engine-hours during April-August 1989.

• Depot engine maintenance costs, while improving, still are averaging about $142 per engine-hour, compared with an anticipated maintenance cost of about $40 per hour.

• About 88% of these maintenance costs have been for parts repair and replacement, of which over 72% was for only four components: power turbine rotor; gas producer rotor/blades; gas producer nozzle; and axial compressor.

• The aircraft is operating at or near its maximum gross weight, and there has been a trend towards increased weight resulting from an expanding USCG HH-65A mission. The LTS 101 engine provides very limited potential for accommodating mission growth.

• Because of potential foreign object damage to the axial compressor, the HH-65A is restricted from hovering or landing in sandy or similar abrasive environments except for urgent operational missions. A particle separator to alleviate this problem cannot be installed because of insufficient spare engine power.

• The HH-65A with the current engine cannot hover on a single engine. In almost all situations, if an engine is lost while hovering, the aircraft will go down.

Textron Lycoming has acknowledged the reliability and maintainability problems with the LTS 101 engine, and has been developing improved component designs and manufacturing processes. A few improvements already are being retrofitted into the USCG's fleet (e.g., wrought axial compressors), and others are in the development process. The improvement program is intended to reduce premature component failures and unscheduled engine removals, and to reduce maintenance costs. (Page xiv)

• The technical risks associated with the LTS 101 improvement program are judged to be low. The improvements use available technologies, and similar component designs have been used elsewhere.

• There are indications of serious management commitment by Lycoming with regard to improving the reliability and maintainability of the LTS 101. For example, a new Lycoming-developed rebladeable power turbine wheel was recently approved by the FAA.

• A reasonably successful engine improvement program would enable the USCG to meet its 71% aircraft availability goal.

• The cumulative 10% discounted cost for the engine improvement program over the period 1989 to 2005 is estimated at between $69 and $90 million (in 1989 dollars), versus $114 million for continued use of the engine with no improvements.

3.1 Proposed Solutions For LTS 101 Problems

As discussed in Chapter 2, component failure and replacement rates for the LTS 101-750B-2 engines installed on the HH-65A are very high. Major problems experienced by the Coast Guard include cracks in the power turbine (PT) wheel, gas producer (GP) wheel blade unwrap, axial compressor blade damage, GP nozzle heat erosion, and oil coking. The USCG has been working with Textron Lycoming to find permanent solutions to these problems under an engine improvement program. In the meantime, some interim fixes have been developed either by Lycoming or by the Coast Guard to improve engine reliability and maintainability.

3.1.1 PT Wheel Cracks
3.1.2 GP Turbine Blade Unwrap and Blade Tip Separation
3.1.3 Axial Compressor Blade Damage
3.1.4 GP Nozzle Heat Erosion
3.1.5 Oil Coking